

looking surprised and amused at the sight of a dignified gentleman attired in black silently walking along the road with a bunch of flowers. After having let him pass by, they noisily chattered and laughed about the strange scene.

Red flowers once again appeared on the dining table after a long period of absence.

"My! This is unusual," exclaimed his daughter.

"The room looks gay again, doesn't it?" smiled his wife.

"Really, it seemed as if there were something missing with-

out them, didn't it? The Friday attraction—a bunch of red flowers—that was the feature of our family!" his daughter joked.

However, in contrast to former occasions, Dr. Takeo did not reply with a jest; instead, he seemed to look a little sullen.

His face mechanically turned toward his son. With an expression more ironical than when Dr. Takeo had first started bringing home flowers, or than when he had ceased bringing them home, his son glanced at him but quickly averted his eyes again.



## APPENDIX

### DOCUMENTS CONCERNING AMERICA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WORLD

#### 1. An Open Letter from the Editors of *Life* to the People of England (Excerpts)

We want to know frankly what you are prepared to do to help us. You may not think that we have any right to ask for help. But you must be realistic. Of course we aren't asking for men or tanks or warships. It's our business to supply those tangible things. What we need is something that we have never in all our history—with but few exceptions—received from the English people, namely, concessions in policy. . . .

So here is one concrete concession that we demand of you, as partners in battle. Quit fighting a war to hold the Empire together and join with us and Russia and your other allies to fight a war to win by whatever strategy is best for all of us. After victory has been won, then the British people can decide what to do about the Empire (for you may be sure we don't want it). But if you cling to the Empire at the expense of a United Nations victory you will lose the war. Because you will lose us. . . .

We Americans are a strange people, may be. You think of us as rather practical—the dollar-lovers, the makers of automobiles, the engineers. Well, we are practical. But you can't understand us at all unless you realize how much principles mean to us. We fought you on principles in the first place. Once in our history we killed 500,000 of our own sons to establish the principles of freedom for the black man. And there's no use pretending that America is going all-out in this war unless it becomes clear to us that this is a war to establish certain principles that we believe in, and to make them stronger than they were when the war started.

Maybe you will object that we haven't defined these principles very well, as yet. That's a fair objection. But let us remind you that one reason we haven't defined them, and one reason that at least half our people are pretty dubious about their existence, is that we are not convinced that you would fight for them, even if they were defined. For instance, we realize that you have a difficult problem in India but we don't see that your "solution" to date provides any evidence of principles of any kind. In the light of what you are doing in India, how do you expect us to talk about "principles" and look our soldiers in the eye? . . . .

If you want to keep us on Your Side you must move part way over to Our Side. If you will do so, then you will find that Our Side is plenty big. . . . It is much bigger than the British Empire. . . . Our Side is as big as all outdoors.

#### 2. Summary of the Dumbarton Oaks Plan for Postwar World Organization

1. The Security Council. The United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and later France, will have the main power and responsibility for keeping the peace of the world. They will have permanent seats on the Security Council of the new league which is to be called "United Nations." Six other states will be elected to the Security Council for two-year periods. The Security Council of eleven will have full powers to put down aggressions without reference to the view of the other nations. The question of voting in the Security Council is still under consideration.

2. Settlement of Disputes. Disputing states should try to come to an agreement through nego-

tiation, mediation, or any other peaceful means on their own account. But if the dispute goes on, the Security Council will take over, the decision to do so coming from the Council itself. The Security Council may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice; otherwise the Security Council will decide what nonviolent methods—such as diplomatic and economic pressure, complete interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communications, and severance of diplomatic and economic relations—might settle the quarrel. All members of the General Assembly must take the actions recommended to them by the Security Council. If these methods fail to settle the dispute the Security Council will have power to take such action by air, naval, and land forces as it might think necessary, using for this purpose the armed forces of the organization's members.

3. **Military Action.** National air force contingents will be held available for combined international action to enable urgent military measures to be taken. The Security Council will determine the strength and degree of readiness of these contingents. A military staff committee, consisting of the chiefs of staff of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and France or their representatives will advise the Security Council on any matter pertaining to regulations of armaments and possible disarmament. Until the Security Council comes into force, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China will consult with the view of taking joint action to keep peace.

4. **The General Assembly.** The General Assembly will consist of all members of the organization. It will have the right to consider general principles of co-operation for keeping peace including those governing disarmament and regulations of armaments. Members should act according to the principle of the organization which is based on the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states. Any question on which action is necessary should be referred to the Security Council. The General Assembly will elect the six nonpermanent members of the Security Council. It is suggested that for the first election three states be chosen for one year and three for two years. Each member state will have one vote. Important decisions of the General Assembly will be made by a two-thirds' majority, others by simple majority of those present and voting. The General Assembly will meet regularly once a year. Each member state should be permanently represented at the headquarters.

5. **The International Court of Justice.** The International Court of Justice will have either a modified statute of the present Permanent Court of International Justice or a new statute prepared with the present one as basis.

6. **The Secretary General** will be the chief administrative officer, with the right to bring to the Security Council's attention any matter which in his opinion may threaten international peace. (Reuter, 9.10.44.)

3. **Commentary of Station KWID (San Francisco) on the Question of Voting in the Security Council, which was left open in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference**

The right of the permanent members [i.e. the Big Four and later France] of the Security Council

to vote on issues to which they are party is a major problem. This right would amount to their opposing action against themselves. The issue then is whether a big power should have the right to vote against league action against itself or, to put it in another way, whether a nation should be permitted to be one of the judges of its own case.

The Russians have objected to the refusal of the right to vote to a big power should this power be a party to dispute. The Russians argued that it was not always easy to define aggression....

In the United States, too, we can imagine a case in which, for example, some South American countries, through their agents, create a revolt in Panama. In that case the United States may in its own interest feel called upon to put down such a revolt. In this example the actual aggressor would be the South American countries but the first open act of aggression may be made by the United States.

*The New York Times* says it should be left to the Security Council as a whole to decide whether one of the powers or permanent members should have the right to vote in its own case. The *Christian Science Monitor*, on the other hand, suggests that it should be left to the permanent members. This is a big difference. If the matter is left to the Security Council and the Council can decide only by a majority vote, the six nonpermanent council members representing the smaller nations could outvote the five big permanent members. The six smaller nations then could refuse a great power involved in a dispute the right to vote against league action. That would make the smaller countries just as powerful as the Big Four.

The problem of voting in the Security Council should be recognized as a very real problem. It is not a problem to be solved by mere organization. For if one of the powers is guilty of aggression—not technical aggression as in the case in our Panama metaphor, but genuine aggression—then the peace organization has already collapsed. (And there is no way to build it so that it would not collapse.) The peace organization would become simply a grand world alliance against the aggressor.

One might say, "Well, why not? What is wrong with the peace organization becoming a world alliance against the aggressor?" There are even people who argue that it may be highly desirable to prepare in this way the ultimate defense of the world against a threatening Soviet Union. But if the Soviet Union should come to believe that this is the purpose of the organization, then she might decline to become a member and feel justified in not joining. We must realize that the position of the Soviet Union is different in this matter from that of the United States. If the United States were involved in a dispute and would not have the right to vote, she could still count on being protected in the Council by Great Britain or France; but the Soviet Union cannot be sure of receiving protection from one of her fellow great powers. Therefore the new organization will have a different character for America or Great Britain on the one hand and for Russia on the other. In the case of America or Britain it could not become a world alliance against either of them; in the case of Russia, the organization might develop into a world alliance against her.

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